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Abstract 
 
 In this paper we explore mirroring challenges 
when an incumbent firm endeavor digital innovation. 
More specifically, we describe how AutoInc, 
organized according to the physical vehicle it 
produces, is challenged when an “over the air” 
software service is developed and implemented.    
Using the mirroring hypothesis as a point of 
departure to understand existing and emerging 
innovation networks, we recognize anarchistic 
actions. The analysis reveals the emergence of 
anarchic actions and how they challenge well-
established federative innovation networks within the 
organization. With continued focus on technology, 
the project and organization disregarded necessary 
social structure development, which resulted in 
reduced capabilities to utilize the digitalized service.  
This qualitative paper also illustrates how the 
mirroring hypothesis, although originating from 
product innovation literature, can be used to 
understand digitalization dynamics. To the end, the 
analysis shows that the digital product innovation 
classification structure may need additional tuning. 
 
1. Introduction  
 
Incumbent firms are challenged today due to 
digitalization [1-4]. For example, the traditional 
camera industry was seriously challenged when 
digital imaging disrupted established business models 
and organizing [5, 6] and it has been recognized that 
social structures, such as processes and skills, needs 
an update in order to cope with the increase of 
software in cars [7]. Not coping with the social 
structures connected to technology advancement has 
proven potentially disastrous [6]. However, it has 
also been highlighted how digital innovation together 
with institutional entrepreneurship has proven 
successful in incumbent firms [8].  
In the last couple of years, much research has 
focused on digital innovation exploring the 
underlying mechanisms, inbuilt practices associated 
with digital innovation and challenges and 
possibilities connected to it [9-11]. In this paper we 
continue on this path and explore digital product 
innovation networks [12] within a firm. More so, we 
use the classification of digital product innovation 
networks as sensitizing concepts [13] in order to 
understand what happens in organizations when 
digitalized solutions are developed and introduced 
into an incumbent firm fitted for product 
manufacturing. We have studied an automotive 
manufacturer, AutoInc, with a particular focus on 
their development work enabling Over-The-Air 
(OTA) software updates. In order to understand the 
prerequisites for the organization to undertake the 
OTA service and do digital innovation, we used the 
mirroring hypotheses [14] as a foundation for our 
analysis as the mirroring concept is reliably 
applicable to automotive organizational settings.  
Mirroring hypothesis stems from modularity, 
product innovation and manufacturing, arguing that 
an organization should mirror the product it produces 
in order to be successful [15, 16]. AutoInc, as many 
incumbent product developing firms, was organized 
according to its physical components, such as a 
division dedicated to powertrain (engine) and one to 
chassis (the internal physical frame). However, with 
digitalization and digital innovation, such mirroring 
needs to be rethought and adjusted [9].  
With this as a background, we asked ourselves: 
How does digital innovation influence mirroring in 
incumbent firms? And more so, how can we 
understand the effects of different digital product 
innovation networks within the same organization? 
With empirical data collected during a period of 
three years at AutoInc, we show how different digital 
product innovation networks exists within the same 
firm and what effects that have. Overall, this study 
generates the following insights:  
 Anarchic actions, in the federative innovation 
network can cause disturbance and 
responsibility confusion. 
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  Anarchy can be interpreted differently (as 
cooperative or non-cooperative) and be 
manifested in at least two different ways; i) 
directly by dictating business-goals and ii) 
indirectly by dictating what fundamental 
technological capabilities would be developed  
and thereby the possible solutions that in turn 
limit or dictates possible business. 
 Practical applicability of the mirroring 
hypothesis can assist in overcoming 
digitalization dynamics.     
The paper proceeds as follows; we begin by 
reviewing the mirroring hypothesis [14, 17] as we 
can see strong support for mirroring at AutoInc. This 
is followed by an overview of the digital innovation 
literature. In the digital innovation literature we hone 
in on digital product innovation networks, which we 
use as sensitizing concepts [13] in order to 
understand what was going on at AutoInc. We further 
direct our attention to anarchism [18, 35] and shortly 
give an overview of the concept. We then describe 
the method used when collecting and analyzing the 
empirical data, followed by presenting the empirical 
case and insights. We end the paper with a discussion 
of our insights and finalize the paper with our 
conclusions.   
 
2. The mirroring hypothesis 
 
The mirroring hypothesis literature is based on 
modularity and asserts that organizational structures 
corresponds to the technical architecture the 
organization attempts to develop. The mirroring is 
described as linkages between the design and tasks 
required in order to realize the design [14, 17]. Other 
research call this socio-technical congruence [19], 
fundamental isomorphism [16], or plainly morphisms 
[1].  
Research has shown that mirroring is highly 
valuable when understanding why organizations are 
structured the way they are dependent on what they 
are developing and producing. It has also been 
highlighted that the mirroring hypothesis does not 
apply well to open collaborative projects, most of 
which focused on software development [17]. 
However, researchers have used the theory as a way 
to understand what happens to organizations when 
digitalization dynamics trigger changes, for example 
when new digital tools are taken into use or new 
software based processes are required [1, 20].  
Hylving [1] extends the concept of mirroring, or 
morphisms, to include second order morphisms. The 
second order morphisms recognize how other 
structures indirectly are connected to the artifact 
being developed. For example, developing user 
experience (UX) possibilities, instead of only a 
physical product, require new business models. 
However, when developing the UX solution it is 
easily done to only focus on the UX solution itself, 
and forget about what supporting structures are 
needed in order to utilize the UX solution [1].  In 
other words, it describes how everything is 
interconnected to each other in one or the other way.  
In this paper we use mirroring hypothesis as a 
starting point since the empirical setting is a product 
manufacturing firm with well-established 
organizational structures based on the physical 
architecture of the product they produce; the vehicle.  
 
3. Digital innovation and digital product 
innovation networks 
 
Digital innovation can be defined as the carrying 
out of new combinations of digital and physical 
components to produce novel products [9]. Digital 
artifacts are produced by ever-changing combinations 
of patterns of technologies, routines and cognition 
[21]. This offers new ways of interacting with, 
thinking about, relating to and working with the 
developed artifacts [22]. As many different industries 
are going thru digital transformations endeavoring 
digital innovation, new logics emerge [2]. For 
example, the automotive industry traditionally 
considered as a manufacturing industry producing 
vehicles, now is categorized as a platform industry 
[8, 23, 24] where a federative way of working is 
implemented around the platform as the central 
module in the highly modularized product 
architecture. Naturally, this involves the network of 
actors responsible for those modules. 
Based on the idea of a network of heterogeneous 
actors [25, 26], digital product innovation networks is 
defined as groups of more or less heterogeneous 
actors and their tools. These groups are included  in 
complex socio-technical networks that embody 
different forms of knowledge [12].  Digital product 
innovation is thereby a distributed phenomenon 
characterized by network effects, messiness, 
ambiguity, and combinability [21]. 
There are four different digital product innovation 
networks, namely; Project, Clan, Federated and 
Anarchic [12]. The Project innovation network 
consists of a rather homogenous group of people 
where control and coordination is centralized. The 
Clan also consists of homogenous people but the 
coordination and control is distributed. The Clan is 
usually driven by a common interest and relatively 
well-defined set of tools that are readily identified 
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 and mobilized for effective cognitive and social 
translations [12]. Example of a clan network are the 
open–source communities [27, 28] where the actors 
act according to their common goal, but with very 
limited, or no, centralized control and coordination.  
The federated innovation network has centralized 
controlled but uses knowledge from a diverse set of 
resources. In large manufacturing organizations, such 
as automotive OEMs, federated innovation networks 
can be considered norm as knowledge, expertise and 
skills are distributed although the control and 
coordination of these resources are centralized [8].  
The Digital Innovation definition of anarchic 
action is based on the dimension of control of the 
process, structure and outcomes, which is distributed 
(and not centrally governed) [12]. This definition also 
includes knowledge resources being distributed and 
not being known a priori, as exemplified in [36].  
According to the Meriam-Webster Dictionary [35], 
anarchism in general is defined as absence or denial 
of any authority or established order. Others have 
described the ultimate goal of anarchism as being to 
create a free society which allows all human beings 
to realize their full potential [18] and to deny 
authority [29]. The general definition of anarchism is 
thereby relative to a presumed governance of some 
form while digital innovation essentially defines it as 
any action that is self-motivated, albeit still 
cooperative. Anarchic innovation networks are in this 
sense dynamic and complex socio-technical systems 
consisting of heterogeneous and self-driven actors 
operating a diverse set of tools and other resources. 
[12]. This diversity of control makes different 
innovation trajectories intervene with and influence 
each other [8]. Anarchic action is here defined as 
action taken by actors in anarchic digital innovation 
networks.  
Institutional entrepreneurship [30] and anarchic 
action [12] are significantly but not entirely 
overlapping ways of acting and being. Institutional 
entrepreneurship is for instance inherently 
endogenous and relative to some form of governance 
[30] which anarchic actions need not be as such 
restrictions are not present in that definition [12]. On 
the other hand, anarchic actions stipulate distributed 
knowledge resources [12] whereas the definition of 
institutional entrepreneurship does not specify such a 
restriction [30]. Institutional entrepreneurs are 
organized actors who envision new institutions as a 
means of advancing interests they value highly yet 
that are suppressed by extant logics [30]. Institutional 
entrepreneurs, thus, clearly fulfill the basic 
requirements to be considered anarchic as defined by 
[12]. However, Institutional entrepreneur’s actions 
are on top of this also aware, and calculative from a 
positive sense (i.e. cooperative and constructive) 
[30]. They are often less connected to organizational 
norms and have a weaker connection to established 
processes and also that they are often disadvantaged 
by prevailing arrangements and stand to benefit from 
change [31]. This presumption of drivers behind the 
action does not exist in the definition of anarchic 
action. This however raises the question what is 
meant by negative, destructive contribution or 
passiveness and what anarchic label such action then 
should have and also who should make the 
determination of what is positive or negative.  
 
 
 
Figure 1: Institutional entrepreneurship vs. 
Anarchic action 
Consequently, there is a void in the more detailed 
definition of institutional entrepreneurship and less so 
in the less restricted (and less colorful) definition of 
action in anarchic digital innovation networks [12]. 
 
4. Method 
 
The following section describes the 
methodological approach on this qualitative paper.  
 
4.1 Data Collection 
 
Along the development cycle of the OTA 
software service, the main author participated in the 
development and observed the progress. This allowed 
him to take part of all business-, requirements- and 
project meetings along with having access to 
documentation connected to the project. The 
participation of the first author started with the 
industrialization of the function in year 2012 and 
ended with the quality audit of the project in year 
2015. Data were collected under a non-disclosure 
agreement and include several hundred documents.  
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 For this paper, we focused on project-, 
governance- and requirements-documents in the form 
of emails, minutes-of-meetings, generated office 
documents, diary notations, plans, and presentations. 
Data was also collected in interviews that were partly 
transcribed and anonymized before being brought 
into the data analysis.  
 
4.2 Data analysis 
 
The analysis of the case study- and project write-
ups [32] were run through key participants in order 
ensure its correctness. Analysis was carried out 
jointly in the research team to achieve 
complementary insights and enhanced confidence in 
the findings [33]. The write-ups as well as interview 
transcripts were the continuous basis of a thematic 
and inductive analysis [37, 13] that focused on 
identifying inconsistencies in the three aspects of 
Organization/Process, Project and Functionality. The 
focus was to detect ‘problems’ which were then 
elaborated and categorized and screened through 
discussions regarding distinctiveness, involved kinds 
of structures (‘is it a lack in social-to-technical 
mirroring, in social-to-social or something else?’) and 
also regarding usability in research documentation 
and presentations.  
 
5. Empirical Findings  
 
5.1 AutoInc before and during the project 
 
Ever since the start of the European vehicle 
manufacturer AutoInc, the company has been 
organized around the physical architecture of the 
vehicle and its traditional lifecycle; design, 
production, sales, and maintenance. Overall, the 
company has had a Product Planning (PP) department 
ordering vehicles and other products, an R&D 
department designing the vehicles, and 
Manufacturing (M/F) responsible for turning those 
designs into real vehicles. Manufactured vehicles 
have then been made available for sales by the 
Marketing and Sales (MS) organization and then the 
After Sales (AS) organization has provided Dealers 
& Workshops with the tools and parts to service the 
vehicles on behalf of the vehicle owners. Finally, an 
IT department providing all of the company with 
computers to automate the work as well as a 
Financial (FI) department assuring the money needed 
to sustain all these activities.  
In particular R&D, Purchasing and Manufacturing 
have internally been organized around the structure 
of the vehicle. For instance, there has been a group 
within R&D designing wheels (rims) and a team in 
purchasing procuring wheels for Manufacturing who 
have had a team responsible for preparing wheels for 
manufacturing and a station in the production line 
where wheels were added to the vehicles being 
manufactured. 
 
 
Figure 2: AutoInc Organization 
Over the decades of vehicle evolution, as vehicles 
begun having electrical system, there has likewise 
been departments throughout the company managing 
what started out as simple lights and horn to today’s 
advanced IT networks on wheels. A car from AutoInc 
include more than 100 small computers (for the 
vehicle alone) called ECUs – Electrical Control 
Units. Each ECU has their own set of software’s 
programmed into them to do their respective parts of 
the necessary functionalities, for example controlling 
breaks or handling all that is visible in the main 
infotainment display. The organization of the 
electrical department in R&D has evolved with this 
evolution in the structure of electrical systems or 
functionalities, including software development 
teams for areas such as energy management, 
infotainment and safety. Consequently, a significant 
flow of software maintenance updates and patches 
(software parts) have also been created, tested, 
approved and provided to the vehicle workshops for 
installation as part of the traditional vehicle service 
appointments. All in very much the same way as 
hardware parts.  
 
5.2 Digitalization transformations at 
AutoInc 
 
In 2012, inspired by the smartphone mobile 
industry and another OEM, AutoInc embarked on an 
infotainment platform project. The infotainment 
system was going to be based on apps such as Spotify 
and ParkingFinder working on top of an ordinary 
operating system instead of having all functionality 
written into one big software embedded in a physical 
component. This would allow fast changes and 
innovation to customer-centric functionalities while 
still also having a more stable basic set of car-centric 
functionalities. It would also reduce cost since the 
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 operating system would be something like Linux or 
Windows instead of some proprietary and very 
special software foundation.  In this way, the 
infotainment system could be relatively long-lived, 
compared to the old concept of a vehicle’s life cycle 
of 5-7 years where software and functionalities were 
intertwined with hardware and more difficult to 
evolve after manufacturing. 
And so it was decided that a ‘remote software 
update’ function, eventually named ‘Over The Air’ 
(OTA) software update, was to be created.  An R&D 
manager expressed it like this: 
 “We need to have [vehicle] systems that are up 
to date. There is a cost in not doing this, but we 
cannot calculate all the option values. We can’t 
calculate ROI by using OTA during the first 5 years 
but hereafter it will have a business opportunity.  We 
know however that we can’t wait. In such case we 
will lose sales and get lower customer satisfaction. In 
the end this is the right thing to do for AutoInc.” 
The order from the PP organization was to allow 
the customer in the vehicle to use a set of preloaded 
and continuously updated apps, and also to update 
any of the basic system software of all of the ECUs. 
The order prioritized the handful of ECU’s that were 
going to be involved in Internet connection 
capabilities and thereby suffer risk of hacking. This 
first order for OTA function therefore also included 
possibilities to update Bluetooth security, WiFi 
security, and Infotainment graphics. 
To match the new situation, the electrical 
department within R&D organized an Infotainment 
Platform group responsible for vehicle Applications 
Programming Interfaces (APIs). The API’s would 
allow user applications like Spotify and Android 
Auto to access less risky vehicle functionalities and 
data like fan speed settings, temperature level, speed 
information, fuel level and more. A group called 
Connectivity was also established. They were 
responsible for the realization of all Internet 
connection related solutions (such as Bluetooth, Wi-
Fi, Mobile tethering, 3G/4G). 
R&D also initiated an Advanced Engineering pre-
development project, an ‘AE’, with the intent to 
deliver technical concepts for the OTA function, for 
example software packaging formats, download- and 
installation mechanisms and security solutions. The 
time plan was to be part of the new vehicle to be 
launched in 2015. The AE-project considered OTA 
as “just another channel” - a wireless version of the 
cord-based software download system that was used 
to service the software of the vehicles in vehicle 
workshops. But instead of this hardwired cord, the 
OTA technology would use mobile communication 
technology (3G/4G) and a cloud platform to transfer 
the software to the vehicle, and a system in the 
vehicle would do the software updates of all the 
ECU’s in the vehicle. 
In Q3 2012, a Function Owner (FO) was added to 
the OTA project. The responsibility of the FO was to 
design the function and in this also translate business-
requirements on the OTA function into function 
requirements, specifying what and how the OTA 
function should work on a solution-independent 
level. 
 
Figure 3: Requirements Organization 
For instance, a business requirement like “The 
function must be robust” could be translated into 
functional requirements like:  
a) “The data and information sent and received by 
the function must be handled by robust 
protocols so that no data is lost due to more or 
less sporadic Internet connection between the 
vehicle and AutoInc”,  
and performance requirements such as:  
b) “The function must take less than 5 seconds in 
continuing operations after downtime or loss of 
connectivity”.  
All such functional and performance requirements 
were documented in the FDR (Function Description 
and Requirements) document. The leader of the AE 
project was subsequently appointed as the Function 
Realization Responsible (FRR) with the task to 
design a solution and in this translate the FDR 
specification into a Function Realization specification 
(FR) and drive creation of a solution that would fit 
that FR. For instance, the requirement a) presented 
above was translated into solution requirements such 
as “There must be a cached communication between 
vehicles and servers of the following format …” or 
“All communication must contain error-detection and 
-correction data of this kind …”.  
At this time, the AE-project had already 
developed the solution concept and the FR was 
mostly already expressing requirements to suppliers 
and also to adjacent technological areas in the car in 
line with that pre-developed concept. Consequently, a 
substantial discrepancy was eventually identified 
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 between the function specification (FDR) and the 
Function realization specification (FR).  
The initial dialogs between FO and different 
business stakeholders, such as MS and AS, also 
revealed the absence of business requirements on the 
function (what kind of customers will use this 
function and how - what do they want?) and overall 
business model (how do we produce and sell this?) as 
well as use-cases (how should the function be used?). 
Essentially, it became apparent that the role of 
Business Stakeholder or business owner never had 
been formally defined at AutoInc since the business 
had always been about selling vehicles and 
accessories, not services or software.  
It also became clear that the organization did not 
have the processes or people to enter into continuous 
dialog with actual customers and from this express 
formal business plans and requirements.  Instead, 
customer input was mostly gained through 3rd party 
market reports and occasional interview studies. In 
addition, it became clear that engineers and project 
managers had compensated the lack of business 
owners and their input requirements and calculations 
by creating rudimentary business-cases themselves to 
motivate or eject deliverables to/from the projects. In 
addition, the business focus of the engineers was on 
vehicle cost. Lifecycle aspects of the deliverables as 
well as profit or even revenue, was limited. 
In Q1 2013, R&D surprised the company when 
one of its officials stated: “We will be allowing the 
customer to add apps individually per vehicle”. This 
new direction was contrary to the already decided 
path by PP and the FO together that the OTA 
function would just update a standard set of pre-
installed systems software, apps and other features 
per market. With this additional capability (customer 
being able to individually add functionality per 
vehicle), the complexity of the function increased and 
new significant risks were added to the project. For 
example, risks associated with having on-demand 
variety in apps, risk of slow/faulty or absent 
downloads. Additional risks related to handling of 
content per vehicle, keeping track of actual individual 
status of software in the vehicles, timing- and error-
sensitivity aspects as well as a higher demand on 
customer interaction. This more difficult goal also 
drove new requirements on testing, training, 
documentation and marketing.  
Finally, the new direction turned the function into 
a highly customer-centric function as compared to 
car-centric functionality. This meant that the 
organization to produce more customer-centric 
functionalities such as ‘Restplaces’ or ‘StoryTel’, 
was going to need to grow and become more 
productive and effective, extrovert and agile than 
before the scope change.  
R&D needed the function to work as a means to 
alleviate pressure on the product development 
process (software quality instead could be 
complemented during shipment of car to dealers). 
The function also enabled R&D to regularly patch 
internet related security software to latest possible 
status. Finally, it also meant a possibility to regularly 
offer new apps in the infotainment system between 
new and old vehicle programs. To assure these 
benefits, R&D claimed the role of business-owners 
and thereby the entitlement to add to, or change, the 
scope of the original order. Although the new 
demands articulated by R&D added cost, complexity 
and risk the whole vehicle project, the strong 
legitimacy of R&D within AutoInc, gave them the 
power to dictate what would be delivered or not. 
In Q2 2013, a Project Manager (PM) for the OTA 
project as sub-project to the total vehicle project, was 
appointed at the AS organization. The PM started 
weekly cross-organizational meetings where all 
technical coordination was brought up. All technical 
leaders related to the in-vehicle solution as well as 
outside of vehicle (‘off-board’), were invited. The 
weekly meetings focused on different technological 
components of the OTA solution, and actions 
required to manage overall risks of not delivering the 
OTA function with right quality in time.  
 
 
Figure 4: Governance Organization 
On an overall OTA project governance level, a 
weekly governing Technical Management Meeting 
was launched, involving senior line managers from 
R&D. This way of organizing sub-project was 
standard operations in vehicle development projects. 
Through technical management meetings like the one 
for OTA, AS, IT and MS together with R&D jointly 
handled overall governing decisions regarding 
resources and priorities of all major separate projects. 
At this time the FRR informed the project that 
R&D would focus on ‘the OTA channel’ because this 
was the vehicle-centric part of the solution. This 
basically meant that the technical solution needed for 
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 the OTA function in the vehicle was essentially the 
only priority for R&D. This was in line with the 
prevailing Automotive development view and 
business model focusing on car and technology. As 
an incumbent traditional vehicle development 
organization, R&D would not take responsibility for 
technical requirements or development outside the 
vehicle that was not directly and technically linked to 
the vehicle (such as supporting IT, sales support, 
workshop support), nor for operations development 
(adding staff, creating or changing processes), 
content handling (overall managing what 
functionalities were built into what software) nor for 
serviceability (assuring solutions for the vehicle 
workshops to be able to service the vehicle). The 
governing Technical Management Meeting accepted 
this. 
In Q1 2014, R&D communicated that due to 
technical limitations, the current software (that was 
traditionally developed to be installed in the vehicle 
in the factory and to update and maintain the vehicles 
at workshops), was not automatically going to be 
possible to install via the OTA function. Any 
software intended for deployment to vehicles via the 
OTA function had to be specifically tailored and 
packaged. If any part of the OTA-package included a 
software that the specific part of the vehicle did not 
support being installed via OTA, then none of the 
software in that package would become installed. 
Since there were only a few parts of the vehicles that 
were going to be able to support OTA software 
installation, this restriction considerably limited the 
potential use of the function. Especially since 
software packages would almost always contain 
multiple software parts. Neither the Technical 
Management Meeting nor the vehicle project 
addressed this issue. Consequently, the project 
organization was never complemented to 
accommodate for the need of generating a new or 
improved software packaging organization. 
In Q2 2014, the persons acting FO and PM were 
additionally tasked with assuring that the OTA 
function could be supported worldwide at dealers, in 
workshops and in call-centers. This included building 
necessary IT-system for the workshop technicians to 
use when looking into the potential errors reported by 
the customers and workshops. The new more 
customer-oriented focus dictated by R&D here 
presented new challenges to AS on top of the 
traditional one; 
a) Support and fault-tracing of a customer-centric 
function rather than a traditional vehicle-centric 
function. 
b) Support and fault-trace any problems with the 
explicit content offers that was now going to be 
individually selectable by end customers and 
per vehicle. 
c) Support a distributed function that was not only 
implemented in the car but involved the 
AutoInc Cloud and other systems. 
While these consequential challenges were 
understood by some of the project members, the 
Technical Management Meeting did not formally 
include them into the OTA project scope. Nor did the 
AS organization traditionally have the formal task to 
define or deploy any separate project for such 
customer-oriented deliverables. AS traditional task 
had always been to develop workshop support 
capability for vehicle-centric functions only. With 
limited resources, AS never created the capability 
necessary for customer support and due to lack of 
resources, the capability for workshop support was 
also severely limited, even by traditional measures. 
In Q3 2015 a quality audit following the official 
end of the project recognized, elicited and 
documented 55 problems from the OTA project. This 
included 42 issues pertaining to governance and 
project management, 9 pertaining to development 
process and actual realization of the function and 2 
issues related to organization and processes. Overall, 
the audit summarized that the limited managerial as 
well as technical and social understanding of the 
sociotechnical structure and complexity of the 
deliverable, was a factor severely impeding 
development as well as governance of the 
development. The report stated that “Responsibility 
for development of connected functions is 
partial/unclear”.  Out of these 55 problems, four (4) 
represented formal quality system deviations, which 
were processed by AutoInc managerial teams on 
behalf of the corporate quality organization. 
 
6. Discussion 
 
Reviewed literature, for instance [1, 14, 15, 16, 
17, 19] all testify to mirroring being more or less 
pronounced and relevant in development. In our 
empirics and theoretical study, we have used the term 
Mismatch to indicate a lack or absence of mirroring 
and from our empirics, we have excavated 3 
exemplifying mismatches.  
The first excavated mismatch exemplify how 
Advanced Engineering can limit delivery of 
functionality. We saw in the case how the money for 
the OTA function was already consumed by R&D 
advanced engineering. As a result, when the 
specification for the OTA function was delivered, 
there was no money nor any time to develop a fitting 
technology concept. The consequential problem of 
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 discrepancy between function requirements and this 
solution concept was solved by truncating the 
specification to match the pre-developed technology. 
This essentially limited the possibilities to deliver the 
OTA solution and required that business accepted 
delaying the development of the missing 
functionalities. We find no distinct account for this 
kind of tech-to-tech mismatches or conflict in the 
reviewed literature [14, 17]. 
The second excavated mismatch concerned a 
dissonance between R&D and the product planning 
(PP) regarding the scope of the deliverable as 
required by business, where R&D declared that they 
would extend the solution to include user’s ability to 
add and delete apps in the vehicles. In other words, a 
change in technological scope or structure posing 
mismatch with mainly organizational structures. 
Interestingly, R&D diversion from the original 
business order in technical solution design decisions, 
was common due to R&D leading projects that 
ultimately had to deliver. With limited resources and 
a set deadline, quality or size of deliverables basically 
remained the only variable. Thus, project down-
scoping and technical compromises are commonplace 
in the everyday R&D activity.  Open controversy 
between what in federative sense is the ordering unit 
(PP) versus delivering unit (R&D), was on the other 
hand rare.  
Both this second excavated mismatch and the first 
were due to anarchic actions as R&D in both cases 
acted on its own accord as a separate party outside of 
the federative norm. In the second example, R&D not 
only claimed their traditional jurisdiction over 
technology solutions but also a partially overriding 
role on the business ordering level. The motivation 
was their own need of the service and also being the 
organization that initiated the idea. R&D decisions 
need not necessarily bring additional mirroring needs. 
However, this second decision redirected 
development towards additional operational changes. 
Regardless of an initiating action being anarchic 
or not, direct and heterogenic mismatches like the 
second excavated mismatch, are relatively common 
in the field of digital innovation within Automotive 
since the organizational structures are very much 
aligned with vehicle lifecycle and technology 
hierarchies and thus in general very poorly resembles 
the structure of distributed and more horizontally 
integrated digital services. Such mismatches pose 
question-marks to the company and projects on who 
(what organization) should be responsible for some, 
often entirely new kind of deliverable. 
Finally, in the third excavated mismatch no one 
was assigned from R&D to be in charge of assuring 
the process and organization for specifically creating, 
packaging, testing and release of software that was to 
be offered and deployed using OTA. R&D task in the 
project was to design and deliver the technical OTA 
solution, not assure there was working content 
available to use it. The mismatch or lack of mirroring 
existed regardless of anarchic actions between an 
organizational need and the already existing R&D 
organization tasked with producing and testing all 
software with the traditional aim of deploying it in 
factory and in vehicle maintenance only. Since the 
project never altered its structure to also design 
necessary organization to produce specific OTA 
software, ultimately a technical solution was 
developed but not the organization necessary to use 
it. 
Looking closer to the defining literature [1, 14, 
15, 16, 17, 19], we find that neither organization-to-
organization nor technology-to-technology mirroring 
are specifically documented as part of the definition 
of mirroring.  Nor is the relation between cause and 
effect such as change in technology scope driving a 
need of other changes or adaptions. This makes it 
difficult to discuss in terms of what kind of change in 
one structure would be needed specifically due to a 
change in another. The theorem and adjacent 
definitions just define the possible existence of 
relations between social and technical structures in a 
timeless manner. Neither does the definitions 
distinguish between different kinds of technical 
structures like Communication, HMI (Human 
Machine Interaction) or Powertrain and how such 
structures may affect one another. Furthermore, the 
second order mismatches or propagated lacks of 
mirroring where one creates another which in turn 
drives a third (and so on) as defined by [1] as an 
extension to mirroring, is left without consideration 
in most other documents.  
This study has highlighted the possible existence 
of mismatches between structures of the same kinds, 
both social and technical in Automotive digital 
innovation. The difference in technological structure 
drove a lack or mirroring in both technology-related 
organizational structure (more agile and capable 
software production and customer support) as well as 
in business organization structures (need to handle 
software and related information more explicitly as 
offers portfolio to customers). Likewise, there was a 
need for difference in company organizational 
structure that was not mirrored by project 
organizational structure and thus the company 
structure was never adjusted. These empirics indicate 
that the concept of mirroring might be possible to 
extend further. Finally, the examples of mismatches 
documented in this article were a few selected from a 
larger set which required no deeper analysis or 
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 elicitation to be found. This indicates that there likely 
are more to be found in this case and possibly in 
many other practical industrial case. 
This study thus indicatively confirms the 
existence of mirroring and inherent anarchic 
tendencies within the same otherwise federative 
Automotive innovation network. The anarchic 
tendencies exemplified, also provide indicative 
verification of the predicted “southeastward” 
movement in the content and scope of product 
innovation. As also stated by  [12], their outlined 
categories can therefore not be discrete. If, however 
they are considered additive and scalable properties 
on a continuum, such a revised theory can better 
account for the empirics of this study as well as for 
nuances already found in the nature of (Automotive) 
digital innovation networks.  
Having continuously scaled additive properties 
however raises the question on how to do a more 
fine-grained evaluation of innovation network 
properties. Consequently, scholars aiming to assist in 
this regard are urged to further explore nuances in the 
definitions of the grading and definitions of the 
existing two properties of the product digital network 
[12] as well as consider if there are additional 
significant effects deserving to be established as 
properties. The concept of institutional 
entrepreneurship [31, 34]  offers some possible 
candidate antecedents to explore further as properties 
of digital innovation networks. Further dive into 
these antecedents, into the difference between the 
concepts and perhaps a suitable basic ontology would 
be great strides towards a further improved digital 
innovation networks properties- or classification 
scheme/continuum. 
 
7. Conclusion and contribution  
 
We can draw several conclusions from this paper. 
First, this paper show that the concept of mirroring is 
indicatively applicable in manufacturing contexts as 
well as software development. Secondly, upon 
entering the world of digital innovation, 
organizations can suffer from indirect and direct 
mismatches. That is, we have illustrated how 
technology does not mirror with technology, 
organization does not mirror technology, and 
organization does not mirror organization. Third, 
anarchic action can exist in federated innovation 
networks. Consequently, the networks described by 
Lyytinen et al (2015) are only a foundation for 
discussion and nothing that can be used to categorize 
groups/networks of people in a definite way. Thus, it 
is possible to look at properties of innovation 
networks and consider the different dimensions as 
continuum instead of four different categories. 
Finally, the concept of institutional entrepreneurship 
may offer candidate antecedents to explore further as 
properties of anarchic action in digital innovation 
networks. 
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